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The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s:
A Review Essay
GILBERT C . FITE
The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s, by Neil E. Harl. Henry A. Wallace
Series on Agricultural History and Rural Studies. Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1990. xv, 305 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, index.
$24.95 cloth.
The Fall of the Farm Credit Empire, by Ben Sunbury. Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1990. xvi, 264 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. $27.95
cloth.
Farming Is in Our Blood: Farm Families in Economic Crisis, by Paul C.
Rosenblatt. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1990. ix, 187 pp.
Appendix, notes, index. $22.95 cloth.
THE THREE BOOKS under reviev^ deal v i^th aspects of the
economic problems faced by farm borrov^ers and their lenders
in the 1980s. That v^as one of those times, common in the twen-
tieth century, when farmers suffered a bust after an inflation-
ary boom. Agriculture experienced several economic ups and
downs after World War I, but one of the most devastating peri-
ods for many farmers was in the mid-1980s.
As a result of world-wide demand, the prices of American
farm commodities began rising sharply in late 1972 and contin-
ued unusually high for the next four years. Wheat that had
averaged $1.76 per bushel in 1972 brought $3.95 in 1973. Corn
sold for an average price of $2.55 in 1973 and $3.02 in 1974,
compared to only a little over $1 per bushel in the early 1970s.
Such good prices made farmers ecstatic. It seemed as though
the eariier surpluses that had so depressed farm commodity




prices were gone forever. Indeed, government officials, farm
papers, and other voices of agriculture indicated either explic-
itly or implicitly that a new day had dawned for American
farmers. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz urged farmers to
plant from fencerow to fencerow to meet the growing foreign
and domestic needs. That seemed like a good idea during the
middle 1970s as prices continued strong.
Many farmers bought more land at high prices, purchased
large and expensive machinery to take care of larger acreages,
and spent more on their living standards. They had no diffi-
culty obtaining credit from local banks and the Farm Credit
System. The Federal Land Banks and Production Credit Associ-
ations and the Farmers Home Administration were all ready to
extend loans.
Land prices rose rapidly under the influence of strong
commodity prices and competition among farmers to buy addi-
tional acreage. As farmers' land increased in value, they had
more security for additional credit. With easily available credit,
and believing that land values would continue to climb, many
farmers in the Midwest paid two, three, even four thousand
dollars per acre for farmland. Interest rates were high, often as
much as 12 or 15 percent. So long as commodity prices
remained high and land values advanced—that is, as long as
inflationary conditions prevailed—most of the borrowers could
meet their debt payments. But if commodity prices dropped
and land prices fell substantially, both borrowers and lenders
would be in serious financial trouble. That is what occurred in
the early 1980s at a time when total farm debt reached about
$200 billion. By the mid-1980s many farmers owed more than
they were worth and went broke. Some banks with large port-
folios of farm loans were forced to close their doors. This is the
background against which all three of the books under review
are set.
NEIL E. HARL'S The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s is mostly a
personal account of Harl's efforts to alert the country to the
approaching farm credit disaster, and his work in trying to solve
that vexing problem. Had, a leading farm economist and agri-
cultural tax expert at Iowa State University, was among the first
to warn that a crisis was in the making, both for farmers and
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their lenders. He provides an excellent inside view^ of hov^ the
farm debt crisis unfolded in 1984 and 1985, and of the mea-
sures designed to alleviate the crisis.
In the first two chapters, Harl explains how the crisis came
about. He is especially critical of the government's encourage-
ment of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, and of the Federal
Reserve Board's abrupt decision in 1979 to reduce inflation,
tighten credit, and raise real interest rates. Furthermore, he
explains that a stronger dollar weakened export demand, and
farm commodity and land prices dropped sharply; between
1981 and 1986 the value of Iowa farmland declined an average
of $1,360 per acre. These conditions reduced the value of farm
assets and lowered farm income to the point where many farm-
ers did not have enough income to pay their debts. Even some
of the most efficient farmers failed, according to Harl.
By early 1984 Harl had concluded that the farm debt prob-
lem was so serious that some remedial action should be taken
before the crisis became even worse. He discussed the matter in
academic seminars, talked to the press, visited with bankers,
and appeared before congressional committees. He argued that
farm debt would have to be restructured, and proposed writing
down some of the principal, extending the time for payment,
and having the federal government guarantee part of the loan.
Although the farm credit problem seemed headed toward
disaster in 1984, the Farm Credit System and officials in the
United States Department of Agriculture were slow to admit
that a real crisis existed. Harl relates numerous interesting
meetings with Farm Credit officials as he tried to point out the
need for action to save both borrowers and lenders. But until
1985, despite huge losses, the Farm Credit System indicated
that it could work out the problem without federal help. By
1985, however, Harl's views prevailed. The federal government
moved toward what became a kind of bailout for the Farm
Credit System. Harl discusses briefly the amendments to the
Farm Credit Act passed in 1985, 1986, and 1987. He also tells
about state efforts to help out, including moratoria against fore-
closures. Finally, he lists twelve lessons that should be learned
from the farm credit crisis.
The Farm Debt Crisis provides a good overall view of the
farm debt problem in the 1980s, and shows the successes and
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failures of an academic from a major land grant university who
recognized the problems early and who tried to find practical
answers. The book is rather hard reading. It contains many long
quotations, has some duplication, and would be improved with
some reorganization. Yet it is basic to understanding the farm
crisis.
BEN SUNBURY'S The Fall of the Farm Credit Empire also deals
v^ i^th the agricultural credit crisis of the 1980s. Like Harl,
Sunbury writes from personal observation and experience. He
served as an assistant to three governors of the Farm Credit
Administration, the supervisory agency of the Farm Credit Sys-
tem. After providing some background on the system, which
originated in 1916, Sunbury concentrates on the years 1985 to
1987, when the system was in greatest danger.
Lending agencies that made up the Farm Credit System,
such as the Federal Land Banks and the Production Credit
Associations, had outstanding loans of some $82 billion by
1983. As both Sunbury and Harl point out, so long as farm
prices remained strong and land prices advanced, this huge
debt was manageable. But lower commodity prices and drop-
ping land values placed the system in jeopardy. By 1985 and
1986 the Farm Credit System v a^s hemorrhaging from bad
loans. During those two years, the system lost about $5 billion
and had billions more in what bankers call nonperforming
loans.
Writing from his inside perspective, Sunbury traces events
as they developed from 1985 to 1987. He agrees with Harl that
system officials were slow to realize the seriousness of the prob-
lem. Sunbury shows how system spokesmen resisted the idea
of federal aid, or some kind of bailout, until it became clear that
the Farm Credit System could not endure without government
assistance. He discusses the laws of 1985, 1986, and 1987,
which were designed to restructure and provide additional cap-
ital for the system. The Farm Credit System emerged from this
period with less independence and more effective federal
supervision.
Sunbury also vérités about personalities and politics within
the system. He ascribes part of the system's difficulties to poor
leadership, especially in the Farm Credit Administration. He
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shows how bureaucracy developed within the system and how
efforts were made to protect jobs at the expense of efficiency.
But he concludes that, despite its problems in the 1980s, the
cooperative Farm Credit System will continue and in all likeli-
hood meet the challenges ahead.
The Harl and Sunbury books complement one another
admirably. They cover much of the same ground, but empha-
size different aspects of the farm credit crisis. Both authors
agree that the main sources of farm credit difficulties in the
1980s were excessive debt, high interest rates, and low farm
commodity prices.
PAUL C. ROSENBLATT'S Farming Is in Our Blood: Farm Fami-
lies in Economic Crisis is an entirely different sort of book.
Rosenblatt concentrates on the human stresses and strains
experienced by farm families during the mid-1980s. It is one
thing to write about a credit crisis in general, and about the
agencies providing loans, but what about borrowers who
became mired in debt and lost their farms? That is Rosenblatt's
concern. A University of Minnesota professor in the Depart-
ment of Family Social Science and Psychology, Rosenblatt
arranged to interview twenty-four farm couples in 1986 who
were, or had been, struggling with credit problems.
In the interviews farmers attributed much of their credit
problem to lenders. They believed that bankers and govern-
ment lending agencies had encouraged them to borrow more
money than was wise or necessary. Although farmers were crit-
ical of lenders, they also blamed some of their misfortune on
bad family decisions, such as borrowing heavily to set up a son
in farming. The interviews also showed that in many cases
farmers placed too much faith in their bankers, and displayed a
lack of careful study and scrutiny when obtaining loans.
The stress associated with economic difficulties created a
heavy strain on some family relationships. Rosenblatt includes
an entire chapter, mostly quotations from husbands and wives,
on family problems during financial crisis. Loss of the family
farm was a major catastrophe. It not only ended a way of life for
the family, it meant the loss of a home. Once farmers realized
that they were in a financial crunch, they did everything they
could to save the farm. They took off-farm employment, cut
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expenses, and did the best they could to protect their assets. But
in follov^-up interviews in 1987, Rosenblatt found that only
fourteen of the twenty-four families were still farming full- or
part-time, and only seven of the fourteen appeared to be finan-
cially secure. The credit crisis had taken a severe toll.
The Rosenblatt study provides important insights into the
human problems and reactions associated v i^th financial stress
on the farm. The extensive quotations from those farmers inter-
viewed give readers a feel for conditions that statistics and eco-
nomic analysis cannot possibly provide. It is clear from this
book that farming really is in farmers' blood.
THE THREE VOLUMES under review combine to paint a
vivid picture of the debt problems facing farmers in the 1980s.
Iowa State University Press is to be congratulated for publish-
ing these studies. Historians, economists, and sociologists will
find the books valuable, but they should also be read by farm-
ers. Farmers could learn a great deal about how to guard against
disasters associated with future boom and bust periods, which,
according to Hari, will surely be repeated in the future. People
may not learn much from history, but they could!
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